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MAKING EXTRACTIVE INVESTMENTS WORK
FOR AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT: WHAT ROLE




At present, emerging economies such as China, are the major importers as
well as investors in Africa’s extractive sector. Indeed, they maintain a
“stranglehold” on the continent regarding finance for development. Their
success in gaining access to the resources of Africa is linked to an effective
strategy that combines trade inducements, increased investment flows, aid
for infrastructure and construction and technology transfers. With the recent
dramatic decline in the price of commodities, and China’s re-balancing with
greater emphasis on consumption-driven growth model, growth prospects in
commodity-dependent Africa has dampened. Qatar, with its abundant
hydrocarbon reserves and US$10 billion foreign exchange reserves, deploys
its “soft power” to enable African countries develop their extractive sector
fully, industrialize and end China’s financial stranglehold on the continent.
Qatar can help develop Africa’s mineral processing industries through public
private partnerships and experience. This is because of Qatar’s track record
as a sound manager of natural resources. This type of partnership will assist
African countries to get more out of their natural resources through value-
addition, and further deepen domestic technological capacity and job creation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Africa is at the epicentre of the global scramble for resources. A continent
endowed with many natural resources, including plentiful land and
* Professor and Senior Researcher, African Studies Center, Leiden University, the
Netherlands Associate Senior Fellow, Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI).
194 AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY:  J. OF SUST. DEV. LAW & POLICY VOL. 8: 1: 2017
1 UNECA, Economic Report on Africa 2013: Making the Most of African’s Commodities
(Addis Ababa, 2013), 8.
2 I. Ramdoo, “From Curse to Purse: Making Extractive Resources Work for
Development” (Discussion Paper No. 136, European Centre for Development
Policy Management (EPCDM, 2012).
3 Cyril Obi, “African Oil in the Energy Security Calculations of China and India”.
In FantuCheru and Cyril Obi (eds.), The Rise of China and India in Africa:
Challenges, Opportunities and Critical Interventions (London: ZED Press 2010),
pp. 181-192.
4 UNECA (n 2); P. Collier, The Plundered Continent (New York: Oxford University
Press 2010).
fertile soils, as well as oil and minerals. Africa has about 12 per cent of
the world’s oil reserves, 42 per cent of its gold, 80 to 90 per cent of
chromium and platinum group metals, and 60 percent of arable land
in addition to vast timber resources.1 Recent discoveries of oil and gas
in Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique and Liberia have raised the
profile of the continent, bringing to light the immense opportunities
that could be derived, but also ringing alarm bells on the potential
challenges this portends for poverty reduction, industrialization, and
sustainable management of natural resources.2 The commodity super-
cycle, largely influenced by rising demand from emerging economies
such as China, benefit many commodity exporting countries, allowing
them to invest the windfall earnings in vital infrastructure and social
services.3
With the recent dramatic decline in the price of commodities, the
sustainability of commodity-based export strategy is under scrutiny.
China’s re-balancing with greater emphasis on consumption-driven
growth has dampened economic prospects in commodity-dependent
African countries. Africa needs deep structural reforms to respond to
these challenges. One possibility is redirecting the continent away from
commodity dependence and towards industrialization and value-
addition in commodities.
Despite impressive Gross Domestic Product growth rates over the
past decade, the continent has not achieved broad-based development
and structural transformation. This is due to several factors: limited
institutional, legal and human capacity to develop and manage
resources effectively; poor capacity to create linkages between the
mineral resource sector and other sectors of the economy through
beneficiation, and value-addition; and poor state capacity in contract
negotiation, collecting and investing resource rents wisely and
sustainably with a view to achieving structural transformation.4
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The aim of this article is to examine the extent to which Qatar can
strategically deploy its soft power towards developing the extractive
and industrial sectors in Africa. While African countries have benefited
from rising commodity prices in the short-term, they exercise very little
control on the management of their strategic resources.5 This is partly
due to the emerging economies, the major importers as well as investors
in Africa’s extractive sector who maintain a stranglehold on the finance
that Africa needs for development. Their success in gaining access to
the resources of Africa is linked to an effective strategy that combines
trade inducements, increased investment flows, aid for infrastructure
and construction (mainly transportation projects to enable better
delivery), and technology transfers.
Qatar, with its abundant hydrocarbon reserves and US$10 billion
foreign exchange reserves,6 can bring to end the BRICS financial
stronghold on African governments, by providing alternative financing
source with fewer strings attached. Qatar can take the lead in support
of the development of mineral processing industries in Africa through
public private partnerships, and experience sharing in terms of the
management of natural resources given Qatar’s track record in this
respect. This type of partnership will assist African countries to get
more out of their natural resources through value addition, further
deepening of the domestic technological capacity and job creation.
2.  CAN QATAR FIND A NICHE IN
GROWING AFRICA?
Major transformations have been affecting Africa’s international
relations since the early 2000s. While the traditional links with the
West remain strong, Africa is moving away from its post-colonial North-
South relations towards a more diverse, business-centric set of
partnerships with a wide array of actors. Newly emerging economic
powers from the global South have started to put their imprint on the
continent in a very significant way. The changing global political
landscape has provided some degree of policy space to African
5 UNECA (n 2).
6 Market Trading Info, “State of Qatar – Economic Review”. <http://gulfbase.com/
Gcc/Index/6> accessed 20 May 2016.
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policymakers to articulate an authentic and transformative continental
development agenda in a manner never seen before.7
Table 1: Africa and New Forms of South-South Partnership
Source: UNCTAD 2010.
The key vectors of interaction between Africa and the new
development partners from the South include trade, FDI portfolio
investments, and development cooperation. Each of the new partners
have taken a strategic approach to deepening their relationship with
Africa. They respectively bundle their aid, trade and FDI in order to
achieve two important objectives – secure long-term supply of oil and
other resources from Africa to fuel their growing economies; and capture
a significant portion of Africa’s growing market in goods and services.
2.1 Trade
The number of sectors in which emerging partners conduct trade varies
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widely: mining, energy, infrastructure, manufacturing, telecommunica-
tions, construction, agriculture, services. Europe remains Africa’s largest
trading partner, with Africa’s trade with Asia rising by 22 per cent
between 2012 and 2013, while trade with Europe grew by just 15 per
cent.8 Manufactured exports from Europe to Africa fell from 32 per
cent of the total in 2002 to 23 per cent in 2011. On the other hand,
Asia’s share in Africa’s trade rose from 13 per cent of the total to 22 per
cent during the same period.9  While China remains the dominant actor
in Africa, the combined volume of trade by the other emerging partners
such as Brazil, Korea, India, and Turkey outweighs China in importance.
Figure 1. Africa’s Trading Partners, 2000 to 2013
Source: UNCTAD (2013), Global Investment Trend Monitor, No.15 and African
Economic Outlook 2015:vi, Figure 4
Notably, much of this growing trade between Africa and the emerging
economies is heavily concentrated in a half dozen African countries
that export minerals and petroleum. If we take China alone as an
example, its top trading partners in Africa are also major exporters of
minerals, precious metals, and petroleum (Figure 2). They include:
South Africa, Angola, Sudan, Nigeria, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Liberia,
8 OECD/AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2015: Regional Development and Spatial
Inclusion (Paris: OECD 2015), p. vi.
9 Ibid.
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Congo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These products
accounted for between 60 and 80 per cent of total exports, a pattern
very similar to Africa’s trade with its traditional partners.10  In 2013, for
example, of the US$602 billion in African exports, oil-exporting African
countries exported US$330 billion, while South African exports
amounted to US$96 billion.11  On the other hand, African imports from
emerging economies are dominated by manufactured goods, industrial
products, and consumer goods – a pattern reminiscent of the old
colonial division of labour. With few exceptions, Africa does not consume
or add significant value to its exports in minerals and commodities.
The continent remains a net exporter of raw materials that fuel prosperity
and development in other regions.12
Figure 2. Trade between China and Top Ten African Countries Measured in
US$ millions, 2010
Source: Peoples Republic of China, China-Africa Trade an Economic
Relationship, annual Report  2011:3.
Given its vulnerability to global shocks, it is imperative that Africa
embarks on a path of diversification, industrialization and value
10 UNCTAD. 2013. Global Investment Trend Monitor, No. 15 and African Economic
Outlook, 2015, Figure 4.
11 AEO. 2015. African Economic Outlook 2015, p. vi.
12 UNECA (n 2).
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addition.13 Ethiopia provides an excellent example. Its inexpensive yet
relatively skilled labour force, coupled with the government’s proactive
policy to court Chinese and Turkish investors as well as its continued
investment in vital infrastructure to reduce transaction cost for investors,
have transformed Ethiopia into an idle investment destination for
Chinese investors who cannot keep up with high labour cost in China.14
The rebalancing underway in China is the result of urbanization and
globalization that is transforming economic geography in a proud way.
Countries that have an effective national development planning capacity
and are able to read in advance the emerging threats and opportunities
in the world economy are more likely to benefit from increased
urbanization and globalization.
2.2 Special Economic Zones (SEZ’s)
China is no newcomer to investment in special economic zones (SEZ),
particularly in Africa. According to Rasagam et al, China’s incentive for
investment in SEZs appears to be anchored in its burgeoning trade
with Africa, both in the import of manufactured goods by African states
and the export of raw materials and natural resources. SEZs are seen
as potential logistics and production platforms for Chinese companies
to further penetrate continental, regional, and national markets. They
benefit Africans by moving some manufacturing and processing
activities from China to these zones, thereby increasing the value
addition of African natural resources and agricultural outputs.15
Moreover, the sustained increase of labour costs in China could create
the opportunity for Africa’s expanding labour force to engage in
manufacturing activities, thereby diversifying the continent’s
specialization pattern. Some economists also believe that with the
establishment of a continental free trade area, Chinese-Africa trade
may well experience dramatic and exponential growth.
2.3 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
Africa continues to attract private capital because of its improved
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business environment. FDI is a large external source of finance but
was surpassed in 2010 by remittances, which also are the most stable
source of external financing. Its FDI which increased fromUS$56.6 billion
in 2013 to US$61.1 billion in 2014 further increased to US$66.9 billion
in 2015, an equivalent of 4.1 percent of GDP. Portfolio flows, on the
other hand, decreased from US$31.6 billion in 2013 to US$24.1 billion
in 2014 because of volatile global monetary and political situations.16
Despite the slow recovery in developed and emerging economies, both
FDI and portfolio equity flows are expected to continue increasing,
underscoring the global private sector’s appetite for the continent’s
opportunities.
Figure 3. Foreign Direct Investment to Africa, 2000-2013
Source: OECD/AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2014:53, Figure 2.5
It is important to note that FDI inflows continue to be unevenly
distributed with a large share going to the extractive sector in a limited
number of African countries.17 In 2013, for example, resource-rich
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countries accounted for 95 per cent of the increase in FDI to Africa,
driven by a surge of US$1.8 billion (+39 per cent) in inflows to South
Africa. The top six recipients, representing one third of the continent’s
population, received the same amount of FDI as the remaining 48
countries put together. The largest recipients were South Africa and
Nigeria, with an estimated US$6.4 billion and US$6.3 billion,
respectively. Mozambique (US$ 4.7 billion), Morocco (US$ 4.3 billion),
Ghana (US$ 3.3 billion), and Sudan (US$ 2.9 billion) close the list.18
The share of the BRICS in Africa’s total FDI stock rose from 8 per cent
in 2009 to 12 per cent in 2012, amounting to US$ 67.7 billion.19 Excluding
the OECD countries, China held the largest stock of FDI in Africa, estimated
at US$ 27.7 billion; followed by South Africa and Malaysia with
US$ 22.9 and US$ 15.8 billion, respectively (IMF 2014). This said,
Africa remains a comparatively minor destination for Chinese outward
foreign direct investment (OFDI). In 2012, for example, Africa accounted
for 4.1 per cent (US$ 21.73 billion) of total Chinese OFDI stock.20
Finally, it is important to recognize that the actual volume of FDI
to Africa from emerging economies is understimated by a large margin
given a broad variety of financing mechanisms that these countries
provide to Africa to finance development. For example, investments
by private entities from emerging economies are most likely registered
as FDI, whereas deals involving state-owned enterprises often involve
a range of financing and are not counted as FDI. Export credits may be
registered as aid, when in fact they may be financing investment in
particular sectors.
2.4 Aid and Technical Assistance
Aid and technical assistance to Africa from the emerging partners has
also been increasing in recent years. Observably, the composition of
aid and the mode of delivery is different from the one practised by the
traditional western donors. It usually consists of concessional loans;
buyers and export credit; and resource-for-infrastructure deals.21
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First, unlike the traditional donors, emerging partners provide more
support in the form of concessional loans rather than grants. Second, a
large proportion of support from these countries comes in the form of
technical assistance tied to project support. Third, emerging partners
tend to provide support to the infrastructure and productive sectors
while traditional partners target the social sector and broad
macroeconomic and sectoral reforms.
What is clear is that, unlike the traditional western donors, emerging
partners from the South exercise a much closer strategic integration of
aid, trade, and FDI to achieve their national interests.22 Despite the
rhetoric of non-interference and no-conditionality, these new partners
impose non-policy conditions, such as access to natural resources or
the purchase of goods and services in exchange for money and
investment promised at the conclusion of the various summits. Angola,
Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) are three
countries where such unfavourable donor practices have been used
extensively.23 Therefore, transforming these unfavourable donor
practices is a precondition for establishing a transparent legal,
institutional, and governance regime that will allow sustainable
management of Africa’s natural resources. Qatar can certainly play the
role of an honest broker by throwing itself into the mix and by
strategically using its soft power.
3.  ALIGNING QATAR’S SOFT POWER WITH
AFRICA’S LONG-TERM PRIORITIES
Joseph Nye defines soft power as “the ability to affect others to obtain
the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or
payment”.24 Nye notes that one can affect the of behaviour of others in
three ways – through threats of coercion (stick); inducements (carrots);
and attractions based on principles or values that others want to
emulate (democratic values).
As a small country heavily dependent on the export of petroleum
to world markets, Qatar has been successful in building up a vibrant
22 UNCTAD (n 8) 45.
23 Cyril Obi (n 4),pp. 181-192.
24 Joseph Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power” (2008) 616 The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 94.
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economy, enviable in the Arab world. It has used its resources
strategically to become an effective foreign policy player and opinion
shaper in the Middle East. The key attributes of Qatar’s “soft power”
include:
i. Political stability in a volatile region by virtue of its strategic
military alliance with the United States.
ii. Model country image owing to its responsible management
of natural resources for development and to create a more
diversified economy – just like Norway.
iii. An effective income distribution policy.
iv. A generally liberal and tolerant social/cultural environment
in a region where conservative Islamic values are the order of
the day.
v. A generous aid policy.
Table 2. Selected Features of Support by Development Partners
Source: UNCTAD, Economic Development in Africa 2010, Table 10.
































Project No platform, 
except for 
IBSA 
Turkey Grants  Project Turkey-
Africa 
Summit 










 Project  
 
204 AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY:  J. OF SUST. DEV. LAW & POLICY VOL. 8: 1: 2017
25 African Union Commission, Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want (Africa Common
Position on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, Addis Ababa: African Union
Commission 2014).
vi. Huge financial reserves that it deploy to establish an alternative
development finance platform that other countries can tap
into to finance major infrastructural projects. This is not only
good for Africa; it is also good business for Qatar.
vii. First rate universities that can serve as a platform for research
and knowledge exchange in the field of extractives
development and the management of resource rents for broad-
based development and industrialization.
Two of these attributes are critically important for establishing a
win-win partnership between Qatar and African countries. The first
deals with Qatar’s successful development experience in translating its
natural resource wealth into broad-based development and well
diversified economy. The second has to do with Qatar’s immense
financial reserve and Sovereign Wealth Fund. This is a strategic resource
that can place Qatar as an important player in the field of development
finance that African countries can turn to.
4.  HARNESSING QATAR’S SOFT POWER TO
SUPPORT AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES
The major issue facing policy makers in Africa is the sustainability and
structural transformation of the economy for the next 50 years. The
high priority accorded to structural transformation has to be understood
within the context of Africa’s historical position in the global division
of labour and the continent’s recent experience with the regressive
policies of donor mandated structural adjustment programmes. The
call for structural transformation is, therefore, designed to end the
perverse process of development described above.
To successfully embark on a structural transformation path, African
leaders have developed a common vision and position on what to do
to achieve Africa’s structural transformation in two important strategic
policy documents. These are The African Union’s Agenda 2063, and the
African Common Position on Post-2015 Agenda (CAP).25 Agenda 2063 is
a forward-looking framework which charts Africa’s development
trajectory over the next 50 years. Agenda 2063 expresses seven broad
2017 MAKING EXTRACTIVE INVESTMENTS WORK FOR AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT 205
aspirations that emanate from the various consultations held with
stakeholders and outlines eleven strategic initiatives to fast-track its
implementation. It builds on the experiences of previous plans such as
the Lagos Plan of Action, the Abuja Treaty and NEPAD as well as other
continental and regional plans and frameworks that are shaping the
continent’s transformation agenda. It delineates the roles of each
stakeholder such as RECs, Member States, Civil Society, private sector
and development partners.
Figure 4. Africa’s development architecture
Source: Compiled by the author.
The adoption of the AU Agenda 2063 coincided with the adoption
of the African Common Position on the Post-2015 Development Agenda.26
The Common African Position on post-2015 Agenda groups Africa’s
development priorities into six pillars each with sub-themes:
i. Structural economic transformation, and inclusive growth.
ii. Science, technology and innovation.
iii. People-centered development.
iv. Environmental sustainability natural resources management,
and disaster risk management.
26 AUC. 2014. African Common Position on the Post-2015 Development Agenda,
(Addis Ababa: African Union).
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v. Peace and security; and
vi. Finance and partnerships.
Figure 7. Key Components of Agenda 2063
The AU Agenda 2063 and the CAP both emphasize the importance
of developing a productive capacity underpinned by value addition,
with a particular attention paid to youth empowerment, gender
equality, and a truly inclusive and transformative global partnership.
The essential pillars of a transformative strategy have been spelled out
in a number of strategy documents adopted by the Heads of States,
such as the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development (CAADP),
the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), and
the African Industrial Development Action (AIDA), among others.27
27 AUC/NEPAD, Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme
(NEPAD: Midrand, South Africa 2003); AUC, “Action Plan for the Accelerated
Industrial Development of Africa” (AU Conference of Ministers of Industry, 1st
Extraordinary Session, 24-27 September 2007, Midrand: South Africa); AUC,
“Strategy for the Implementation of the Plan of Action for the Accelerated
Industrial Development of Africa” (Conference of African Ministers of Industry,
18th Ordinary Session, Durban, South Africa, 24-28 October 2008, (AU/MIN/
CAM/3 (XVIII).
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Therefore, the Quatar-Africa Partnership must be guided by these and
other Africa-owned, and Africa-led development frameworks.
4.1 What should the Qatar-Africa Partnership
Prioritize?
The AU Agenda 2063 and the African Common Position on the post-
2015 Agenda have zeroed in on the key policy pillars that are necessary
for achieving a structural transformation and an inclusive growth. Many
of these strategic issues have been echoed in several issues of the
Economic Report on Africa published by ECA since 2010. These policy
pillars include:
4.2 Leveraging Green Growth through Agriculture
(value addition and processing)
Agriculture remains central to most African economies. According to
the African Development Bank, the agricultural sector in Africa employs
65-70 per cent of the workforce, and occupies a third of the continent’s
GDP. The continent is endowed with 60 per cent of the world’s rain-fed
arable land estimated at a potential of over 300 million hectares.28 Yet
by 2007, the continent had become a net importer of food and
agricultural products with imports exceeding exports by about US$ 22
billion.29 The African agricultural sector is deficient in capital needed
to improve farm productivity, enhance crop yields and produce more
food for consumption.
Much remains to be done in boosting the productive capacity of
the sector through modernization of farming, increasing crop yields,
rapid investment in infrastructure (roads electricity, and water) and
increasing the supply of inputs like improved seeds and fertilizer, equipment
and machinery for medium and large-scale farming as well as financing
services. This presents opportunities for Qatar and potential investors
to partner in industrial and semi-industrial ventures such as food-processing
agro-industries, that have the potential to link with global value chains,
thus increasing incomes and jobs for African countries.
4.3 Industrializing for Job Creation (value-addition)
African exports are dominated by primary commodities, thereby limiting
28 AGRA, Africa Agriculture Status Report (Nairobi: AGRA 2013).
29 FAO, “Why Africa Has Become a Net Food Importer?” (2011).
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promising potential gains from value addition, potential employment
opportunities from processing primary commodities, and finally Africa’s
competitiveness in global markets. At present, the continent’s share in
world manufacturing value addition has remained very low, standing
at 1.5 per cent, down from its value of 1.9 per cent in 1980.30 A
concerted effort is required on the part of African governments and
their development partners to change the current situation. On the
African side, governments must institute the necessary legal and
regulatory frameworks to attract FDI and domestic investors in the
natural resource development sector.31
On the other hand, external partners such as Qatar should invest
more in a network of value-chain industrial enterprises in the natural
resource sector, specializing in processing, value-addition and marketing
of mineral-based products. Manufacturing provides opportunities for
integration and value addition for both the agricultural and extractive
sectors, and for the best use of the continent’s comparative advantage
that can help boost further export earnings and revenue generation.32
4.4 Social Development
A recent report from the ECA highlights that economic growth registered
in Africa has not reduced poverty as expected in the light of underlying
inequalities among social groups that continue to constrain equal
opportunities and result in differentiated outcomes. The report further
informs that “a one per cent increase in inequality increases poverty by
2.16 per cent in Africa, where gender inequality persists”.33 Therefore,
measures and commitment to ensure welfare outcomes such as income
level, job security, personal health and social security protection for
workers, especially women and the youth, will need to be put in place
along industrial and agricultural value chains from national to global
levels.
Countries will also need to ensure a match between demand and
supply of labour skills. A new partnership with Qatar can offer lessons
30 ECA, Economic Report on Africa 2014: Dynamic Industrial Policy in Africa (Addis
Ababa: UNECA and African Union Commission 2014).
31 UNECA. 2015. Economic Report on Africa 2015: Industrializing through Trade,
(Addis Ababa: UNECA), Chapter 4 on Global Value Chains and Industrialization.
32 UNECA (n 2).
33 ECA. 2014.  “Overview of Recent Economic and Social Developments in Africa.
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to African countries on how to go about developing their natural
resource sector through value-addition and diversification, institute
inclusive social policies in order to ensure the right of African citizens
for basic health and education, and provide adequate and descent jobs
to the growing African population that are under the age of 24.
5.  GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR A MUTUALLY
BENEFICIAL QATAR-AFRICA PARTNERSHIP
Genuine partnership entails much more than aid. It must include, in a
holistic manner, the entire spectrum of economic, political, social and
cultural relations between the cooperating parties. It also encompasses
such values as trust and openness that are difficult to measure but
which cannot be avoided if the relationship is to endure.34 The new
Qatar-Africa partnership must be guided by the principles outlined
below.
5.1 Compatibility with African Aspirations
The new Qatar-Africa partnership will be based on Africa’s aspirations
for structural transformation and inclusive and green growth, and will
support its vision for economic diversification with enhanced
productivity and value addition across economic sectors, that would
result in sustainable employment and income gains. As past experience
has shown, the development process cannot be sustainable if the partnership
does not allow ample scope for African initiatives and aspirations to serve
as the main organizing principles of the partnership.
5.2 Transparency of Interests
Partnerships work well when both parties place their interests squarely
on the table right from the start. These should include not only expected
benefits from the partnership, but also areas where the partners cannot
see eye to eye or agree all the time. By being explicit from the beginning,
the partners will be able to find a middle-ground without jeopardizing
the opportunity to pursue long-term and beneficial economic relations
between them.
34 H. Kifle, A Olukoshi, L Wohlgemuth, A New Partnership for African Development:
Issues and Parameters (The Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala 1997), pp. 12-13.
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35 The above principles derive from important frameworks each building on the
previous to shift from aid effectiveness to effective development cooperation,
including: (1) the Rome Declaration on harmonization in 2003; (2) the Paris
Declaration with additional principles (ownership, alignment, managing for
results and mutual accountability) in 2005; (3) the Accra Agenda for Action
(AAA) in 2008, and its focus on civil society and parliament engagement,
capacity development and enhanced role of recipient countries in determining
the use of aid funds and untying aid; (4) the Bussan agenda in 2012 with focus
on domestic resource mobilization, enhanced private sector engagement and
fostering Private Public Partnerships; and (5) the Mexico agreement in 2013
with a special focus on development cooperation with fragile states.
5.3 Alignment of Expectations
The partnership will ensure alignment of expectations, mutual interests
as well as competencies and capabilities from both sides at policy and
strategic initiative levels, where socio-economic and political gains can
be shared tangibly and equitably. The focus on productivity technology,
market and investment opportunities addressing multi-dimensional
demand from both sides will be crucial in ensuring a win-win
partnership. It will also address the nexus between trade, foreign policy
and development cooperation.
5.4 Result-orientation
Partnerships are not set in a vacuum; they must lead to tangible results
or deliverables that validate the contribution of the partnership, as
there always are with other partnerships, such as China. This is done
through a monitoring and evaluation framework that sets benchmarks,
targets and mechanisms to measure results. Such a framework also
establishes that parties are mutually accountable for the progress made
towards achieving the set objectives.35 This ensures mutual account-
ability. To take advantage of the new partnership, African countries
must institute reforms, such as an enabling business environment,
stamping out corruption, and reducing redtape.
6.  CONCLUSION
Indeed, Qatar, more than any country in the Middle East, is better
positioned to assume the role of an honest broker between African
countries and foreign firms and governments wishing to invest in Africa’s
extractive sector. It can do so in several ways: offering alternative
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36 UNECA (n 2).
37 UNECA. 2014. “Innovation and Technology Transfer for Enhanced Productivity
and Competitiveness in Africa” (Background Paper 2014).
financing platform; building local capacity in resource extraction and
value-addition; and by strengthening science and technology education.
These activities will enable African countries to take a strategic approach
to make the most out of natural resources through beneficiation,
diversification and industrialization.36 To help African countries achieve
these objectives, Qatar must consider the five measures discussed briefly
in the following paragraphs.
The first is investment in the infrastructure sector to promote
industrialization. A strong infrastructural base is critical to economic
transformation, whether in agriculture or industry. The continent still
lacks adequate infrastructure, including crucial linkages to markets such
as collection centres, storage facilities, regular trucking facilities; roads,
railways and ICT to support its growing economies, particularly in the
rural areas. At present, transport costs in Africa are high compared to
other regions. This is also true of the reliability of energy supply. It is
estimated that over 60 per cent of people in sub-Saharan African will
still not have access to electricity by 2020.Effective policy and
investment in all forms of transport, communication, energy, and
logistics are needed to increase competitiveness of industry and
agriculture as well as boost trade.
The second is investment in technology, innovation, and research
and development in the extractive sector. Technological advances and
innovation are important determinants of competitiveness across
economic sectors at the continental and global levels. Unfortunately,
Africa still lags significantly behind other regions in science, technology
and innovation.37 The continent’s contribution to global knowledge
production in the sciences is abysmal. In 2012, Africa accounted for
about 0.8 per cent of the world total of about 2.35 million patent
applications. Creating an enabling environment for innovation and
technology transfer requires building a virtuous cycle between research
centres/universities, industry and market that will provide rapid catch-
up opportunities. This would require forging strong partnerships with
African institutions of higher learning to enhance technical skills, access
to technology, product innovation, organizational and management
processes, and marketing approaches to be able to compete in global
markets.
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Third is establishing an alternative financing platform for the
extractive sector. Qatar can help break the BRICS financial hold on
Africa by establishing an alternative financing platform for the extractive
sector. There is a huge opportunity for private equity investors in sectors
such as infrastructure and agriculture that has the potential to generate
high return on investment. Qatar can lead the way on this.
Fourth is the need to build local capacity in resource extraction
and value-addition. This involves public private partnership agreements
to expand a network of medium and large value-chain enterprises
exclusively focused on processing, value addition, and marketing of
minerals and other extractive resources, including agricultural
development and processing. This will open enormous opportunities
for employment to large numbers of Africans while laying the foundation
for the growth of indigenous extractive firms.
Fifth is the need to enhance the bargaining capacity of Africans
through research, training and structured dialogue. To this end, it is
necessary to establish, for instance at Hamad Bin Khalifa University
Center for Natural Resource Governance aimed at providing short-term
and long-term training to officials and legal experts from Africa in
resource governance, bargaining and negotiation skills. The initiative
requires close consultation with the Africa Union (AU) and the UN
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). This will be tailored to support
the activities of the African Mineral Development Centre and the African
Land Policy Initiative. The Centre will also be able to promote structured
dialogue among African policy makers and the extractive industry by
organizing high-level workshops and seminars. The key here is to
balance inspirational goals and the reality on the ground. Capacity
building should aim to bridge the gap and asymmetries between host
countries and foreign investors (i.e., contract negotiation; licensing
practices; transfer pricing, and so on).
It is clear from the foregoing analysis that a long-term and sustained
economic development strategy in Africa will require a strategic
approach in the development and management of Africa’s natural
resources.38 This will entail, on the part of African governments, the
adoption of a fully integrated economic beneficiation strategy that
deliberately encourages innovation and pays particular attention to
38 ECA and Emerging Markets Forum “Africa 2050: Realizing the Continent’s Full
Potential” (2009).
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the industries and services associated with inputs in the extractive
sector (e.g. mining) as it has to do with post-mining processes and
industrial use. A special focus should be directed at the enabling factors
such as infrastructure development, rapid adoption of technology
innovation, human capital development and institutional capacity
building, in order to fully harness Africa’s natural resources to achieve
broad-based development and industrialization.39 Moreover, African
governments must also ensure that Qatari investors build necessary
infrastructure, and viable industrial capabilities with forward and
backward linkages to promote internally articulated resource clusters
and regional value chains.
39 In recent years, ECA’s flagship report, Economic Report of Africa, have covered
topics such as the role of the developmental state; unleashing Africa’s potential
as pole of global growth, making the most of African commodities; and the
industrial policy imperatives for the continent.
